In the late 1970s, economists began to examine the impact of oil price shocks on inflation. In what became known as the importedinflation hypothesis, increases in the price of imported oil were said to cause supply-side shocks that led to inflation. 4 This hypothesis is prominent in macroeconomics textbooks. The most frequently cited textbook example of cost-push, supply-side, or supply-shock inflation is the case of rapid increases in the price of foreign oil during the 1970s.
5
This article examines the contents of 23 leading macroeconomics textbooks. The examination indicates the textbook oil story of inflation often relies on casual empiricism based on an implicit correlation between rising oil prices and inflation rates. Furthermore, most textbooks fail to integrate monetary policy directly into their oil story. We conclude that the typical textbook treatment of cost-push inflation is flawed. In what follows, the weaknesses of the oil example of costpush inflation are discussed. We contend that when the cost-push oil story of inflation fails to directly integrate the role of monetary policy, the imported-inflation story could have been presented using prices of any basic imported commodity. Econometric evidence is presented showing that the price of imported zinc statistically explains inflation as well as the price of imported oil. Yet, this does not mean that zinc prices economically explain inflation. Because the typical textbook oil story of inflation, albeit employing implicit correlations, fails to distinguish between economic significance and statistical significance, readers are likely to be misled about the cause of inflation. and inflation, we offer an explanation for inclusion of the oil story of inflation even if it is flawed and misleading. We contend the oil story is included in macroeconomics textbooks even if flawed and misleading because many economists believe it and because it is an easily understood, low-cost explanation of inflation that is consistent with Keynes's view of price level determination. We conclude our discussion of the rationale for the oil story with a discussion of personal correspondence with the textbook authors to determine their reasons for including the oil story.
PROBLEMS WITH THE TEXTBOOK STORY OF OIL PRICES AND INFLATION
Typical of the discussion contained in textbooks, Baumol and Blinder (1994, 823) explain that "inflation need not always emanate from the demand side. Restrictions in the growth of aggregate supply-caused, for example, by an increase in the price of foreign oil-can shift the economy's aggregate supply inward." According to Ruffin and Gregory (1993, 313) , "The oil-induced reductions of supply pushed up the general price level." Furthermore, Gordon (1993, 262) contends that "the most important single source of supply inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s in most industrialized countries in the world was a sharp increase in the price of oil." For Peterson and Estenson (1996, 349) , "The rise and fall of OPEC . . . was a major factor in the rampant inflation of the decade." And Baily and Friedman (1995, 458) conclude that "the surge in inflation in the 1970s is hard to explain without allowing for the OPEC price increases and other supply shocks."
The timing of inflation is also part of the oil price story in many textbooks. Several suggest that the recent bouts of inflation occurred at the same time as the oil price changes. Samuelson and Nordhaus (1995, 261) argue that "in 1973, in 1978 , and again briefly in 1990 . . . oil prices rose sharply, and business costs of production increased . . . a sharp burst of cost-push inflation followed the oil-price increase." Yet, differences of opinion concerning the exact timing exist that do not appear to be based on the use of different measures of prices. McConnell and Brue (1996, 157) indicate that "the rocketing prices of imported oil in 1973-74 and again in 1979-80" led to "rapid cost-push inflation." Parkin (1998, 481) concludes that "the largest increases [in inflation] occurred in 1974 and 1980, years in which the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) resulted in exceptionally large increases in the price of oil." According to Baily and Friedman (1995, 375) , "The increases in the price of imported oil . . . were . . . in 1973 and again 1978-79," whereas according to Barro (1993, 129) , "Sharp increases in the price of oil . . . occurred in 1973 -74, in 1979 -81, and in August 1990 An evident weakness with the oil price story is that many textbooks present summary figures on oil prices and inflation rates showing an implicit correlation between the two. For example, a typical textbook story is that oil prices are said to have increased about three-to fourfold between 1973 and 1974, and the U.S. inflation rate is said to have increased about two-to threefold for the same years. A similar story is told for the 1979 to 1980 period (e.g., Baily and Friedman 1995, 378-82; Branson 1989, 509-11) . Other textbooks present as many as two or three decades of annual figures on oil prices and inflation rates, showing an implicit correlation between the two (see Froyen 1996, 213; Gordon 1993, 261; Mankiw 1994, 235-36; Ruffin and Gregory 1993, 313) . None, however, contains any formal, statistical analysis of its data.
The reliance in textbooks on the historical correlation between oil prices and inflation rates as evidence of the primacy of oil as the prime culprit in causing the inflation of the 1970s is potentially misleading. Because macroeconomics textbooks do not include discussion of statistical concepts, the distinction between causation and empirical correlation is all but completely ignored. 8 Readers frequently are merely informed that oil prices rose sharply in the 1970s and inflation followed. They also are often shown figures on oil prices and inflation rates for the 1970s and 1980s that move together with the conclusion that one caused the other. Gordon (1993, 261) suggests as much from a graph of annual oil prices and inflation rates when he comments, "Notice the upsurge in inflation in the top frame at the times of the two oil shocks in the bottom frame." Froyen (1996, 211-13) implies the same conclusion from data on the price of crude oil for 1965 to 1991, as does Mankiw (1994, 235-36) from annual figures on the change in oil prices and the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the 1973 to 1987 period.
A more fundamental problem with the textbook story about oil prices and cost-push inflation is the failure to consider the issue of changes in monetary policy as an integral part of the oil story. If monetary policy is included during the discussion of oil prices and inflation, the usual discussion is about how monetary expansion can cause demand-side inflation and accommodate or ratify the oil price shocks. But the monetary authorities are typically treated as if they responded only to the whims of OPEC during the 1970s, or to domestic political pressures caused by OPEC, rather than had a policy of their own. There are some exceptions to this treatment. The most striking exceptions are several textbooks that fully and directly integrate monetary policy into their oil stories and, to varying degrees, treat the monetary authorities as if they had a policy of their own during the 1970s.
9
None of the textbooks, however, presents money supply figures as part of its oil story, showing just how rapid the growth of the money supply was during the 1970s. Table 1 contains both M1 and M2 measures of the money supply for the period 1960 to 1979 for selected industrialized countries. With few exceptions, the money supply growth in the 1970s was greater than in the 1960s. The percentage growth in each measure of the money supply for the two decades for the selected countries is presented in Table 2 . These money supply figures or the percentage growth in them could have just as easily been presented in textbooks in place of the oil price figures in juxtaposition to inflation rates. Yet, if money supply figures are presented at all, they are in a separate chapter on monetary policy. Consequently, another difficulty with the textbook presentation of the oil story is that a discussion of the causes of inflation (and the oil story) and a discussion of monetary policy are often contained in distinctly separate chapters.
10
Discussion of one especially confusing picture of inflation during the 1970s is worthwhile. Gordon (1993) first presents the OPEC price shocks in terms of real business cycle theory that integrates the role of money, concluding oil shocks lead to a higher aggregate price level even when the nominal money supply is constant (pp. 197-202) . 11 Two chapters later, inflation is defined as a continuous and sustained ). Yet, in the next chapter, Gordon employs the quantity equation to conclude that (1) the fundamental cause of inflation is excessive nominal GDP growth; (2) inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon; and (3) without monetary expansion, a supply shock will cause only a temporary upsurge in inflation (pp. 285-89).
12
Other textbooks likewise present a potentially misleading picture of inflation during the 1970s because they too appear to claim both a supply-side view and a monetary view of inflation. Mankiw (1994, chap. 6 ) argues that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon. Yet, in other chapters and in a different context, Table 1 . NOTE: The percentage growth in the money supplies does not take into account any institutional or reporting system changes during the periods.
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07) tells a supply-side oil story of inflation with no discussion of monetary policy whatsoever. Baily and Friedman's (1995) text contains a chapter entirely on monetary policy and inflation (chap. 6) and another entirely on supply-shock inflation (chap. 12), in which monetary policy plays a very secondary role. 13 Hall and Taylor's (1993, 233-36, 240-42 ) is one of the texts that fully integrates monetary policy directly into its oil price discussion, contending that without an increase in the money supply, the price level will return to its original level following any price shock. Nonetheless, in a topic box separated from the main text, figures on changes in oil prices and the CPI for the 1970s and 1980s are presented with the conclusion that "oil price shocks are clearly passed along into total inflation" (p. 234), but with no caveat about the money supply.
The conventional wisdom and the typical textbook story is that the money supply increased in the 1970s in response to political pressures in the wake of exogenous OPEC oil shocks. Macroeconomics textbooks accordingly do not entertain the notion that oil prices might have been a reflection of the products derived from oil whose prices increased because of independent expansionary monetary policy.
14 Verleger (1982, 181) argues this is the case, concluding that "the official price for crude oil set by OPEC countries is determined by the prevailing prices of the products derived from the crude on the major world petroleum markets." Bohi (1983) also concludes that consumer demand was driving world crude oil prices during the 1970s. Duck (1993) presents convincing evidence that a difference in monetary policy across countries, not differences in factors such as oil price increases, accounts for differences in inflation rates. Yet, none of these studies is cited as part of an alternative explanation for inflation during the 1970s by any of the macroeconomics textbooks that tell the oil story of inflation.
15

AN ECONOMETRIC EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE TEXTBOOK OIL STORY OF INFLATION
The typical textbook oil story is that the rising price of foreign oil, and an increasing dependence on foreign oil, caused the domestic inflation of the 1970s. Although no macroeconomics textbook includes explicit statistical results, the typical story implies there is a significant correlation between oil prices and inflation rates that is economically significant. We now show that a similar statistical argument could have been implied for any basic imported commodity in place of oil. For illustrative purposes, we employ zinc in our econometric example, but similar results could be obtained for dozens of other basic commodities. 16 Zinc is a basic commodity that is an input in many products. 17 Interestingly, a group of European zinc producers behaved similar to OPEC during the 1970s-they conspired to fix zinc prices and markets. 18 Furthermore, there was increasing dependence on imported zinc in the 1970s. 19 For these reasons, zinc is a good substitute for oil in our econometric example of the textbook story of inflation.
For purposes of comparison, we first determine to what extent the textbook oil story explains inflation rates. Accordingly, the following equation is estimated:
where P t j is the annual inflation rate in country j during year t, PO t j is the average price of imported crude oil in country j during year t, IO t j is the proportion of total crude oil consumption imported by country j during year t, and e is the stochastic error term. Annual data for 1956 to 1978 for selected industrialized countries-Australia, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States-are employed. Equation (1) is estimated because it describes the most common textbook oil story. We are not suggesting equation (1) accurately portrays the causes of inflation. We are only suggesting that it accurately portrays the oil story of inflation presented in many macroeconomics textbooks. 20 The regression estimates are presented in Table 3 . Five of the six estimated coefficients for the oil price variable are positive and statistically significant at the .05 level or better; five of the six R 2 s are quite high; and five of the six F ratios are statistically significant. The "poor" results are for Germany only. The obvious problem with interpreting these results as an explanation of inflation is that the oil price variable captures a large amount of the natural correlation that exists between any inflation index and commodity prices. Although not shown in any macroeconomics textbook, these results are implicit in the textbook oil story. The difficulty in interpreting the economic significance of these results is equally applicable to the textbook oil story because textbooks imply there was a similar significant correlation between oil prices and inflation during the 1970s and then argue that the implicit statistically significant correlation was economically significant.
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Replacing oil with zinc in equation (1), the following equation is estimated:
where P t j and e are defined as in equation (1), PZ t j is the average price of imported zinc in country j during year t, and IZ t j is the proportion of total zinc consumption imported by country j during year t. Equation (2) is identical to equation (1) in every respect except that zinc is substituted for oil. The zinc equation is estimated for the same countries and years as the oil equation. 22 The regression estimates for zinc are presented in Table 4 . The results are even "better" than those for oil are. All coefficients for the zinc price variable are positive and statistically significant at the .01 level; five of the six estimated R 2 s are quite high; and all F ratios are statistically significant.
Given the zinc results, textbooks could have told a zinc story of inflation during the 1970s and could have presented evidence for zinc that would have been as statistically striking as the actual or implicit evidence presented for oil as the cause of inflation. Yet, we suspect that textbook authors would be hesitant to conclude from this type of statistical relationship that zinc was the economic cause of the double-digit inflation of the 1970s. In fact, if economists wanted to determine the role of zinc prices in causing inflation, we suspect they would estimate a more sophisticated model of inflation that explicitly accounted for the role of monetary policy, as well as zinc prices.
THE RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION OF THE OIL STORY OF INFLATION
Presumably, authors and publishers are rational individuals whose intent is to sell as many textbooks as is consistent with wealthmaximizing behavior. Yet, if we are correct, many macroeconomics textbooks include material that relies on casual empiricism, do not 62 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW accurately explain the phenomenon discussed, and are potentially misleading to readers. How is it consistent with selling a wealthmaximizing quantity of textbooks to include flawed and misleading information? Is there some type of market failure in the reviewing process? In the publishing process? Would not competition among authors, or among publishers, prevent flawed and potentially misleading information from surviving in the market? Even if authors consider the oil story of inflation flawed, it might be included in textbooks. If including a flawed and misleading oil story does not reduce the demand for textbooks, the oil story might survive the marketplace. Whether authors of the oil story would include a different and less flawed story of inflation would depend on whether including a more accurate explanation would increase the demand for their textbooks. Whether other authors would include a different explanation of inflation as an alternative to the oil story would depend on whether including a different explanation would increase the demand for their textbooks.
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OUR EXPLANATION FOR INCLUSION OF THE OIL STORY 24
The obvious explanation for the oil story of inflation is that textbook authors, as well as instructors and professors who adopt textbooks, believe it is an accurate portrayal of the primary cause of inflation. Whether they are Keynesians or monetarists, neo-Keynesians or real business cycle theorists, new classical macroeconomists or something else, they embrace the argument that increases in the price of imported oil in the 1970s decreased the aggregate supply curve, which in turn caused a higher price level or inflation.
What is not obvious is why so many textbooks would present their argument with as much casual empiricism, purporting to document increasing costs, as that found in the surveyed texts. We argue that an important reason for this emphasis is that many of the authors were trained in a Keynesian tradition and that some were and are devout followers of Keynes. Many were schooled in the decades immediately following the Depression, prior to the ascendancy of monetarism, and prior to the ascendancy of the new classical macroeconomics. They were schooled in the Keynesian view that the overall price level depends on the relationship between the growth of productivity and the growth of wages, where inflation is the result of money wages (costs) increasing more rapidly than productivity. Simply put, many textbook authors were schooled with an emphasis on a cost-push view of inflation.
The first exposure to macroeconomics for many students who later became professors was quite often a textbook with a Keynesian orientation-most likely Samuelson's Economics. 25 Over time, other authors imitated Samuelson's approach to macroeconomics. 26 Many of today's professors were exposed either to Samuelson or to textbooks that imitated Samuelson's approach to macroeconomics. To the extent that many classroom instructors today possess an essentially Keynesian view of macroeconomics, with its emphasis on a cost-push explanation of inflation, inclusion of the oil story will help increase the demand for an author's textbook.
There are equally important alternative reasons why the oil story of inflation is included in macroeconomics textbooks even if it is considered flawed and misleading. It is included because it is an easily understood story for professors to tell to today's students. Who are these students? And why might the oil story be so easily understood? Many students are first-generation college students. A substantial proportion work at least part-time while in school, and a nontrivial proportion work full-time while in school. 27 Many are older and have work experience. Many are likely to have notions and attitudes about the economy that may be difficult to overcome in the classroom. And, by students' own admission, many do not appear to be highly motivated to study.
28
It should not be surprising that economics textbooks tell the oil story of inflation. It is a simple, straightforward explanation that is very easy to understand. Oil-and petroleum-based products are used everywhere. Oil products are very visible commodities, and their prices are readily observable. Every car uses gasoline. Many homes and businesses use heating oil. And, because inflation means higher prices, higher oil prices must be the explanation for inflation. The data are straightforward and unambiguous. Any table of annual figures on oil prices and inflation rates during the 1970s shows the two moving together. Textbook authors and classroom instructors can point to the obvious-the explanation for inflation! Economics is a difficult discipline for many students to understand. It is nearly impossible for some. Economics is a more difficult subject to understand than other disciplines for most students because it is a conceptual science. Students often struggle with the idea that economics is a way of thinking rather than a discipline that is defined by a particular subject matter. The complexities, nuances, and subtleties involved in economics can make careful economic reasoning difficult even for professional economists.
The oil story of inflation is a simple, low-cost story for classroom instructors to tell. The cost of telling the story is even lower if it is presented in textbooks. To fully integrate monetary policy into a classroom explanation of rising oil prices and inflation is personally costly to instructors because it involves more complexities and subtleties and is less direct than the oil story alone. The higher personal cost to instructors of presenting a more accurate and complete, but more complex, explanation of inflation would be particularly evident at colleges in which students already struggle with the complexities and subtleties involved in economics. 29 Consequently, if one textbook excludes the oil story when others include it, that could cost the author adoptions of his textbook. For most professors, it would be personally costly, in terms of teaching their students, to adopt a textbook that contained a more complex and less direct explanation of inflation. Publishers consequently have incentives to publish an oil story textbook. 30 To the extent that salaries and tenure of professors are at least partially dependent on student evaluations, classroom instructors have an additional incentive to make the material simple and straightforward for their students. This is true to the extent that unfavorable evaluations of professors by students result at least partially from more complex and difficult material being taught in the classroom and presented in the textbooks and to the extent that the behavior of instructors is influenced by student evaluations.
31 Accordingly, textbook authors have an additional incentive to keep the material uncomplicated even if flawed and misleading. Moreover, there appear to be efforts to "dummy down" and shorten discussions within economics textbooks. 32 At least one informed observer claims that textbook examples of economic phenomena are so simplified and often meant to be only illustrative of possible explanations of economic phenomena that the realism of the examples has become a secondary issue.
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THE TEXTBOOK AUTHORS' EXPLANATION FOR INCLUSION OF THE OIL STORY 34
If only one conclusion is to be drawn from our correspondence with the textbook authors, it is that nearly all authors whose textbooks include the oil story of inflation believe its general outlines. Overwhelmingly, the authors state that the oil story is included because they believe oil prices played a nontrivial role in the inflation of the 1970s. Some give oil a big role, others give it a smaller role, but few give oil little or no role. For example, in reference to the explanatory power of the import price index in his macroeconomic model, Ray C. Fair argues "the evidence is fairly strong that oil price shocks had a big effect in the 1970s." 35 In agreement is Alan S. Blinder, who argues that oil prices "contributed greatly" to the inflation of the 1970s.
36 Others assign oil a much smaller role. Paul A. Samuelson claims there were numerous factors in the inflation of the 1970s-declining productivity improvement, crop shortfalls, the structure of the labor market, and ill-fated wage and price controls, among others-"with oil being only one of many important supply-side complications to simpliste Quantity-Theory behavior." 37 Ralph T. Byrns, Robert J. Gordon, and Wallace C. Peterson appear to be in general agreement with Samuelson's view. 38 An important issue among the authors is how to refer to the role that oil prices played in inflation. Blinder makes a clear distinction when he says, "I certainly believe that the oil price increases of the 1970s (and early 1980s, by the way) contributed greatly (caused is a bit too strong) to the high inflation." 39 But for Campbell R. McConnell, the oil shocks appear to be more than just contributing to inflation when he writes, "I believe there is such a thing as cost-push inflation and this (the oil price increases) is perhaps the extreme example." 40 For Joseph E. Stiglitz, oil is an important explanation of inflation. He states, "I include the oil-price story in my textbook because it is the single most important factor in explaining the most significant period of U.S. inflation since the immediate aftermath of World War II." 41 However, the role of oil prices is quite different for Peterson, who says, "The oil price increases . . . were a major factor in the inflation of the 1970s, but not the sole, or even major, cause." 42 Peterson explains that the inflation started in 1966 when President Johnson increased military expenditures at a time of low unemployment, and, among other factors, expenditures on the Vietnam War continued to increase. Then, there was a breakdown in the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts, leading to rapidly rising money wages. "Thus, the basic cause of the inflation of the 1970s was money wages rising much more rapidly than productivity, although obviously the oil price increases added further pressure on costs and prices." 43 With his emphasis on the relationship between money wages and productivity growth, Peterson writes, "Basically, what I think the experience of the 1970s demonstrates is the validity of Keynes's theory of the price level, as set forth in The General Theory."
44 Although Peterson is the only author with an explicit reference to Keynes, we believe correspondence from others also supports our contention that macroeconomics textbooks include the oil story of inflation at least partly because the story supports a Keynesian view of price level determination. A more or less Keynesian approach to inflation appears to be implicit in the correspondence of others.
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Disagreement among the authors over the role of monetary policy in the inflation of the 1970s is evident. Many consider the role of monetary policy, to varying degrees, to have been accommodating or validating the oil shocks. 46 Several authors write that monetary policy had an independent role in the inflation of the 1970s. Karl E. Case could not be clearer when he writes, "Monetary policy must have played an independent role." 47 Richard G. Lipsey is also unequivocal when he writes, "Monetary policy played both an independent role and validated the oil price shocks."
48 Others are generally in agreement with the position of both an independent and an accommodating role for monetary policy. 49 For some authors, monetary policy is more endogenous than for others. Byrns is explicit, stating that "we view monetary policy as at least partially endogenous." 50 Also, Robert J. Barro writes, "The oil shock tended to promote monetary expansion and therefore inflation." He also claims the evidence from other developed countries "is suggestive that a common disturbance-i.e. likely oil shocks-interacting with a common approach to monetary policy was the likely cause of the world inflation." 51 Michael Parkin is emphatic about the role of monetary policy in the inflation of the 1970s, arguing that the oil price increases "did not cause" inflation-monetary policy did.
52 Two of the authors, Byrns and Samuelson, imply a much less important role for monetary policy than others via their emphasis on the multiple factors that explain inflation during the 1970s. 53 Another author, Gordon, appears to suggest that all factors are equally important in explaining inflation when he states, in reference to his "complete theory of output fluctuations and inflation," that "Demand and Supply shocks are totally symmetric."
54 But Peterson does not consider the overall role of monetary policy during the 1970s to have been either independent or causal. 55 An especially striking observation from the correspondence is how many authors who acknowledge the importance of monetary policy to the oil story of inflation also readily acknowledge their textbooks do not integrate monetary policy into their oil story. Our claim that pedagogy is an important reason why monetary policy is not directly integrated is confirmed by the correspondence. As McConnell writes, "The omission of monetary policy in discussion of the oil-price story is largely one of logistics in our text." 56 McConnell and Brue (1993) do not present monetary policy until after the oil story has been presented. The same is true for Baumol and Blinder (1994) . Blinder readily acknowledges the reason monetary policy is not integrated "is pedagogy: We tell the oil story many chapters before monetary policy is introduced." 57 Boyes and Melvin (1994) also do not integrate monetary policy into the oil story because "monetary policy is not covered until a later chapter." 58 Yet, Melvin writes, "I personally do not believe the oil price shocks can be a source of inflation without monetary accommodation. . . . I believe that monetary policy was largely responsible for the inflation experienced." 59 The oil story of inflation without a discussion of monetary policy is included in Boyes and Melvin (1994) so that their textbook presents "an even-handed overview of the subject that includes the variety of economists thinking." 60 Byrns acknowledges that even though he believes that "monetary policy is at least partially endogenous," it is not directly integrated into the oil story partly because his book "is necessarily simplified being aimed at sophomores." 61 Byrns notes that although he would like to expand the discussion of monetary policy, "The trend in publishing is to reduce the total number of pages in a text." 62 Several authors, who emphasize in their correspondence the importance of monetary policy being integrated into the oil story, claim in the correspondence that we have misrepresented their textbooks'positions on not integrating monetary policy.
63 After a careful scrutiny of each textbook, we believe that our interpretation of each is correct. The confusion among the authors is that although they indeed include monetary policy in their textbooks, it is included as part of a general historical discussion of inflation during the 1970s rather than integrated into their oil stories. To repeat our interpretation, neither Baily, Gordon, Mankiw, nor Stiglitz actually integrates monetary policy directly into his discussion of the oil story of inflation, even though each considers that it should be integrated.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The most frequently cited example of cost-push inflation in macroeconomics textbooks is the example of the oil price increases of the 1970s. Estimation of the relationship between zinc prices and inflation showed that textbook authors could have just as convincingly told a story of increases in imported zinc prices, instead of imported oil prices, and cost-push inflation. The oil and zinc regressions are estimated not because they accurately describe the economics of inflation but because the estimated model, albeit a straw man, accurately depicts the evidence on oil prices implicit in many macroeconomics textbooks.
Although it is evident from correspondence with the textbook authors that none considers that oil price increases were the sole source of inflation during the 1970s, many of their textbooks present a story that might lead readers to that conclusion. It is also evident from the correspondence that there is much disagreement among textbook authors about the cause(s) of inflation during the 1970s, especially the role of monetary policy in the inflation. We have suggested that the oil story (without an integration of monetary policy) is included in textbooks because it is a low-cost, easily understood explanation of inflation that is consistent with a Keynesian cost-push view of price level determination. The correspondence indicates that an incomplete oil story is often told for pedagogical reasons and provides limited support for the contention that the oil story is included because it is consistent with Keynes's theory of the price level.
What we have done is call attention to the problems with the textbook treatment of cost-push inflation and indicate that the textbook oil story raises several methodological questions. We are not suggesting that discussion of supply-side shocks should be deleted from macroeconomics textbooks. On the contrary, we suggest the real effects of the oil shocks as documented in the literature should be discussed.
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On the inflation side, we only hope that macroeconomics textbook authors would avoid the type of casual empiricism found in textbooks and integrate monetary policy directly into their oil story of inflation. We believe they should distinguish more clearly between changes in relative prices, possible one-time shocks to the price level (actually documenting the shock to the price level), and permanent and continuing changes in the price level. We also hope the authors would be more careful, reflecting on whether they want readers of their textbooks to conclude that inflation is simply explained by increasing prices, albeit the prices of "important" commodities.
NOTES
demand-pull and cost-push is less common in intermediate textbooks, it is still used. For intermediate texts that employ the demand-pull and cost-push dichotomy, see Branson (1989, 181, 471-80, 510-11) , Mankiw (1994, 305-07) , and Peterson and Estenson (1996, 466-72) . Many intermediate texts still present a dichotomy of the causes of inflation but use the more common terms aggregate demand (or demand) inflation and aggregate supply (or supply) inflation (see Froyen 1996, 206-14; Gordon 1993, 238-39, 260; Baily and Friedman 1995, chaps. 6, 8, 12) . Froyen (1996, 209-11) also uses the term cost-push to describe the effects of factors that decrease aggregate supply. For intermediate macroeconomics texts that do not present a simple dichotomy of the causes of inflation, see Barro (1993) , Dornbusch and Fischer (1994) , Hall and McElroy (1996) .
4. For the theoretical literature on the imported-inflation hypothesis, see Black (1978) , Bruno (1978) , Hamada and Sakurai (1978) , Hudson and Jorgenson (1978) , and Klein (1978) . For empirical studies of the impact of oil prices on inflation, see Cebula and Frewer (1980) and Rasche and Tatum (1981) . For a general overview of the oil crisis, see Issawai (1978) .
5. For textbooks that cite oil price increases as the prominent example, and in some the only example, of supply-side inflation during the 1970s, see Baily and Friedman (1995, 148, 375-78, 380-82, 396, 458) , Baumol and Blinder (1994, 683-84, 823) , Boyes and Melvin (1994, 196, 222, 225, 394-95) , Branson (1989, 471-80, 509-11) , Byrns and Stone (1995, 368-72) , Case and Fair (1994, 333, 342, 362) , Ekelund and Tollison (1994, 603-604, 721) , Froyen (1996, 211-13) , Gordon (1993, 262-64, 267-70) , Lipsey et al. (1993, 663, 697) , Mankiw (1994, 34, 235-36, 305-07) , McConnell and Brue (1996, 157, 161, 229, 341-42) , Parkin (1998, 384-86) , Peterson and Estenson (1996, 349-50, 459, 462-63) , Ruffin and Gregory (1993, 313) , Samuelson and Nordhaus (1995, 261) , and Stiglitz (1997, 370-71, 424) . Barro (1993, 129) cites the oil example as the cause of (an apparently) one-time increase in the "general price level." Then, the text warns readers: "We should not conclude that an increase in the relative price of [just] any commodity leads to a rise in the general price level" (p. 129). Parkin (1998, 717-18) cites the oil price shock as an example of a "cost-push inflation" while also stating that a "supply shock on its own cannot cause inflation" because inflation is a monetary phenomenon. The only textbooks surveyed not citing rising oil prices as causing "inflation" are Dornbusch and Fischer (1994) , Hall and Taylor (1993) , McElroy (1996 ), Miller (1994 ), and Taylor (1995 . These textbooks do use the oil price increases during the 1970s as examples of supply shocks (or price disturbances) that have temporary output and price effects.
6. As McCloskey (1985) and McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) have argued, economists regularly confuse statistical significance with economic significance. That is, they inappropriately use statistical tests to tell them whether a variable is important in an economic sense.
7. Ruffin and Gregory (1993, 313, 8. Only one textbook contains any discussion of the difference between causation and correlation; see Stiglitz (1997, 19-21) .
9. See Case and Fair (1994, 341-45) , Dornbusch and Fischer (1994, 230-35) , Hall and Taylor (1993, 233-36, 240-42) , Lipsey et al. (1993, 680-89, 695-97) , Parkin (1998, 530-31, 717-19), and Taylor (1995, 464-66) . Ekelund and Tollison (1994, 719-22 ) also discuss expansionary monetary policy and oil price shocks together, acknowledging that some economists blame OPEC for inflation during the 1970s and others blame monetary expansion. Nonetheless, they do not indicate whether one view of inflation or the other is more appropriate. Stiglitz (1997, 367-74 ) discusses demand-pull inflation, cost-push inflation, the OPEC oil story, inflationary 21. For several especially striking textbook examples, see Baily and Friedman (1995, 378-82) , Branson (1989, 509-11) , Mankiw (1994, 235-36) , Ruffin and Gregory (1993, 313) , and Samuelson and Nordhaus (1995, 261 ). example at least presents figures on the changes in oil prices and changes in the CPI.
22. Australia's zinc data are missing for 1956 to 1970, and Japan's zinc data are missing for 1956 to 1962.
23. There is also an implicit presumption that an author's reputation would not be affected by either inclusion or exclusion of the oil story.
24. This section of the article was completed prior to our correspondence with the textbook authors to determine their explanation for including the oil story.
25. For documentation of the dominance of earlier editions of Samuelson's Economics and the argument that it had a primarily Keynesian motif, see Skousen (1997) .
26. For example, see Gordon (1993) , McConnell and Brue (1996) , and Peterson and Estenson (1996) .
27. Based on a fall 1996 survey of college freshmen from about 500 institutions, 40% planned on working part-time while in school and 6% planned on working full-time (see McEachern 1997, 2) .
28. Based on a fall 1996 survey of college freshmen, 64% said they studied 5 hours or less per week during their last year in high school and 36% reported that they were regularly bored in class (see McEachern 1997, 2) .
29. Most macroeconomics classes are taught at nondoctoral 4-year institutions and 2-year colleges. The available data from the U.S. Department of Education indicate there were 3,561 public and private universities and colleges in fall 1994. Less than 5% (156) were classified as universities, 56% (2,008) were classified as other 4-year institutions, and 39% (1,397) were classified as 2-year institutions. The data are from various tables reported in The Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac (September 2, 1996) .
30. As noted above, there are textbooks that fully integrate monetary policy into their explanations of inflation during the 1970s. Presumably, the authors have found a niche market for their alternative explanations. We expect that niche generally to be at upper-echelon colleges and universities.
31. Evidence exists that grades given by classroom instructors are influenced by the introduction of student evaluations (see King, Myers, and Stratton 1994) . 32. A colleague of the lead author recently received the publisher's reviews of his introductory textbook manuscript requesting that he water it down, particularly because he included a chapter that thoroughly discusses how to work with graphs. Furthermore, an anonymous referee of this article contends there is pressure from publishers to keep texts short, stating, "I know this for a fact for a very limited sample of two texts."
33. This is the view held by an anonymous referee of this article, who is involved in the review of textbooks.
34. We contacted the 36 authors and coauthors of the textbooks examined to determine their reasons for including the oil story of inflation. We received responses from 19. 35. Personal correspondence, 1 July 1997. 36. Personal correspondence, 11 July 1997. 37. Personal correspondence, 28 August 1997 (emphasis in original). 38. This conclusion is based on personal correspondence with each author dated 6 July 1997, 5 July 1997, and 3 July 1997, respectively. 39. Personal correspondence, 11 July 1997 . 40. Personal correspondence, 25 July 1997 . Personal correspondence, 25 July 1997.
